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Abstract   Neither our evolutionary past, nor our pre-literate culture, has prepared 
humanity for the use of technology to provide records of the past, records which in 
many context become normative for memory. The demand that memory be true, 
rather than useful or pleasurable, has changed our social and psychological under-
standing of ourselves and our fellows. The current vogue for lifelogging, and the 
rapid proliferation of digital memory-supporting technologies, may accelerate this 
change, and create dilemmas for policymakers, designers and social thinkers. 
Introduction 
The relationship between memory, representation and recollection is highly unu-
sual and counterintuitive. In particular, memories can misrepresent past events in 
what would seem to be all key respects, and yet still facilitate immediate recogni-
tion of veridical representations (e.g. video footage of an event). Many psycholo-
gists (Loftus and Palmer 1974, Wells 1993), have been able to show that eyewit-
nesses can be deeply unreliable in recall, especially if misled by queries or 
interfering information, yet this does not preclude accuracy in identification. The 
fact that a person was misremembered as having dark hair and a moustache does 
not mean that they might not be recalled with the shock of recognition: “yes, that’s 
the fellow!” 
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Clearly, the ‘filing cabinet’ metaphor of memory (that it contains a set of repre-
sentations of the past, organized to facilitate retrieval, such that exposure to a suit-
able cue will facilitate recall) is as inappropriate as it is naïve (cf. Warnock 1987, 
8-9). Memory is constantly changing, in response to conversations with other peo-
ple about events, constant narration of events by oneself and others, exposure to 
news reports, photographs, videos, and inference from the effects of the remem-
bered event. My memory of an event may misrepresent the non-moustachioed 
man, but once I have seen a photograph of him, I realise that he had no moustache, 
and my memory adapts accordingly. 
As the old Maurice Chevalier song had it, 
We met at nine. 
- We met at eight. 
I was on time. 
- No, you were late. 
Ah yes, I remember it well. 
The joke here is that the two singers have completely opposite recollections of 
the significant event in their lives, and yet agree entirely on its identification. As 
Marcel Proust (still one of the most acute theorists of memory) argued, one’s 
memories are coloured by one’s present assumptions and mental models; an ap-
parently insignificant event can appear significant in retrospect because it con-
tained a first encounter with a person whom one later came to love. 
In this chapter I shall discuss the use of technology to support recollection. In 
particular, one often uses representations such as photographs to support recall. I 
shall make the obviously idealizing assumption that a photograph does not misrep-
resent the past in the way that a memory can; the camera was pointed and the im-
age captured. Of course images can be Photoshopped, but that requires human in-
tervention to cause the misrepresentation. Further, images can give a false 
impression, as for example when a trick of perspective makes a distant large ob-
ject look near and miniature; again, the misrepresentation requires a human inter-
preter. As a matter of fact I do not think that mechanical reproductions are essen-
tially veridical representations, but it will make the argument simpler and clearer 
if we pretend that they are, in contrast with human memories which may or may 
not be veridical. 
I will focus on what is normative for memory, and shall argue that the use of 
technology has increased the prominence of truth in that role. This is not neces-
sarily a bad thing, but it is a newish development, and as technological supports 
increase dramatically, will continue to drive important social and psychological 
change. These considerations should be used to help drive our reactions and regu-
lations in areas such as privacy, deletion, data protection and informational self-
determination. 
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The Technology of Memory 
Human memory has always been a rich source of inspiration and metaphor for 
computer memory (O’Hara et al 2006a), but our understanding of human, machine 
and social memory is converging in ways that are more than metaphorical (O’Hara 
et al 2006b). Memory-supporting technology, which at least initially was con-
ceived as a medical resort, has branched out into the areas of leisure, social net-
working and self-improvement (Garde-Hansen et al 2009). 
Moore’s Law have taken such technology out of the medical arena and into the 
social. The fact that one can more or less store anything one likes means that re-
cording requires a very low cognitive overhead – one needn’t worry about the ex-
tremely tedious tasks of choosing what information to store, or deciding what to 
delete when the memory gets full. Meanwhile, improved search and retrieval 
techniques mean that one can find what one needs relatively straightforwardly. 
One can, in short, use memory technology indiscriminately – which makes it usa-
ble (O’Hara et al 2009). 
Furthermore, the indiscriminate use of such technology chimes in with the as-
sociative ways that human memory works. We store all sorts of pieces of ‘useless’ 
information, precisely because we do not know at storage time what will be useful 
in the future. The guesses we make about what memories are likely to be im-
portant in the future are unlikely to be right all the time, so the more raw material 
that is present in our records of the past, the more likely we are to have everything 
that is useful (Bell and Gemmell 2009). 
It has been calculated that it would be straightforward to store 70 years of high 
quality video taken from a lifetime (Dix 2002); this has prompted the United 
Kingdom Computing Research Committee1 to propose ‘Memories for Life’ as a 
Grand Challenge for computing research (Shadbolt 2003, O’Hara et al 2006b) – in 
other words, a potentially epoch-making area for research where breakthroughs 
would promote not only computer science, but also social well-being in a wide 
population (http://www.ukcrc.org.uk/grand-challenge/current.cfm). As a Grand 
Challenge, research groups have been coalescing in this area, looking for example 
at the use of machines to act as companions for humans (Wilks 2010, O’Hara 
2010a), or the difficulties for archivists in curating the digital records of notewor-
thy people.2 Elsewhere, special-purpose tools have been helping communities use 
websites as collective memory resources.3 
Prosthetic memory has been a major area of research. For instance, one device, 
the SenseCam developed by Microsoft,4 is a small digital camera designed to take 
                                                          
1 An expert panel of the British Computer Society, the Council of Professors and Heads of Com-
puting, and the Institution of Engineering and Technology to promote computing research in the 
UK (http://www.ukcrc.org.uk/about/index.cfm). 
2 http://www.bl.uk/digital-lives/. 
3 See e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/memoryshare/ or http://www.livememories.org/Home.aspx.  
4 http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/cambridge/projects/sensecam/.  
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photographs passively, without user intervention, while it is being worn around 
the neck. It has no viewfinder or display to frame photos, but instead is fitted with 
a wide-angle lens that maximizes its field-of-view, ensuring that nearly everything 
in the wearer’s view is captured (Hodges et al 2006). To review the SenseCam 
output, it is remarkably effective to run the resulting set of pictures as a speeded-
up movie (De Bruijn and Spence 2002). 
SenseCams have been shown to have remarkable positive effects on the memo-
ries of at least some sufferers of severe memory impairment (Berry et al 2007). 
However, these and similar devices are also used more and more frequently to 
record the behaviour of those with non-impaired memories, either to achieve an 
objective picture of real-life behaviour (of great value, for example, in market re-
search – cf. Byrne et al 2008), or simply to record the quotidian details of daily 
life (Lee et al 2008, Doherty et al 2009). 
The practice of using such devices to record daily life in an indiscriminate way 
is called lifelogging. The lifelogger simply uses devices that amass information, 
and then stores the results. The SenseCam is a special-purpose recording device, 
but one can also use devices with other functions that generate records as by-
products; mobile phones, Web browsers, email programs, social networking sites 
and medical sensors all generate information that is of potential interest to the life-
logger (especially among younger people with their greater tendency to integrate 
digital and connected technology into their daily lives – O’Hara et al 2009). 
There are many important pioneers in this space, including Steve Mann who 
has for many years worn devices to record his daily life,5 and Jennifer Ringley, 
who achieved notoriety in 1996 for broadcasting the output of a camera in her 
bedroom across the Web (the so-called JenniCam – Jimroglou 1999). Perhaps the 
most committed is Microsoft executive Gordon Bell, who has developed a suite of 
technologies and practices to deal with the giant quantities of information one can 
generate in a normal life, and who has written about the potentially transformative 
effects of such technologies for work, health and learning, as well as in everyday 
life (Bell and Gemmell 2009). 
If such technologies become more ubiquitous, then they will have social effects 
with which we all will have to deal. A lifelogging world would be characterised 
by universality, both in terms of a high proportion of people owning extensive 
records of their lives, and of those digital records covering a high proportion of 
people’s activities, so that more people would have access to more of their past 
lives. Such records are likely to be relatively durable; even though there is always 
a danger of file formats becoming outdated and unsupported by present-day ma-
chines, the greater awareness of this problem in the computing industry means that 
more adaptable general-purpose standards for representational formats are likely 
to emerge. There is a strong likelihood that lifelogging records would be shared, 
not only because of the relative ease of copying and transfer compared to non-
digital formats, but also because of a greater willingness to use the World Wide 
                                                          
5 http://www.eecg.toronto.edu/~mann/. 
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Web as a sharing format, for instance on social networking sites (O’Hara et al 
2009). The power of a great deal of information amalgamated from several of 
one’s own devices, the lifelogging stores of others, information from social net-
works (e.g. Facebook or Flickr) and publicly-available information (e.g. using 
Google or Wikipedia) could be immense in the provision of a rich picture of one’s 
own life (and, as a by-product, of other people’s too). 
The Normativity of Truth for Memory 
We (and other animals) have memories because they help the organism survive. 
Our bodies have mechanisms that allow the world outside to change some of their 
states, allowing adaptation to, and ultimately recall of significant episodes. There 
is no need for those episodes to be represented exactly or accurately; it may be 
that the value of a fear reflex is greater if it is triggered more often than need be 
(in other words, that the ‘memory’ of an organism is more effective if it tends to 
generate falsely positive identifications of threats). Forgetting also has its own 
adaptive value when the past event was traumatic. Memory’s utility stems from 
the smooth functioning of the self rather than the veridicality of its representa-
tions, as the novelist Sebastian Barry suggests: 
It wasn’t so much the question of whether she had written the truth about herself, or told 
the truth, or believed what she wrote and said were true, or even whether they were true 
things in themselves. The important thing seemed to me that the person who wrote and 
spoke was admirable, living, and complete. (Barry 2008, 309) 
The use of external objects and constructed aspects of the environment to sup-
port memory is relatively recent and has tended to colour our perceptions of what 
is important about memory. Studies of oral cultures, which lack recourse to per-
manent representations, show that memory and the reconstruction of the past can 
have very different properties than we are used to in our technological world 
(Goody 1998, Ong 1982, esp.57-67, 95-99, 136-152). 
In such cultures, verbatim recall of lists or words is rare – unsurprisingly, as it 
has very little obvious function in such a society. Early anthropologists occasion-
ally dismissed the memories of ‘primitives’ as flawed because they had difficulty 
in regurgitating lists of words – yet of what use is that ability when one has no ex-
aminations to pass? Recollection becomes a performance, a creative act. History, 
for instance, becomes indistinguishable from politics, so that when an elder recites 
the ancestors of a chief through an implausibly large number of generations, what 
he is really doing is placing the chief in a political context which makes sense. The 
‘ancestors’ that are mentioned allow connections to be made between important 
dynasties, and so the elder is not performing an impressive feat of memory, but ra-
ther reflecting current power structures. Memory of past events, or of a complex 
ceremony, is distributed across the participants of the discourse. The aim of mne-
monics is to stimulate, not to aid recall. All communication is face-to-face, and so 
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there is no need to leave records for others to use in the future, or to ‘speak’ to 
people remotely. 
In an oral culture, the whole notion of ‘misrepresentation’ is up for grabs. What 
is the truth here, when there is no permanent certified ‘truth’ or record available 
for comparison? The ‘fact’ that the chief’s great-great-great-great-great-
grandmother is such-and-such will be a matter of the completest indifference to 
him, and so there will be no attempt to keep any kind of record of it; hence when 
the elder announces a family connection that everyone accepts, what counts is that 
it is acceptable. 
The development of literacy gradually provided a certified record against 
which individual memories could be compared for accuracy. Written words sup-
ported recall, but also furnished an independent standard. Adjustment to the lit-
erate world took time. In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates took issue with those who re-
lied on the written word; ‘You have not discovered a potion for remembering, but 
for reminding; you provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, not with 
its reality’ (Plato 1997, 552). This attitude remained for centuries; when Mon-
taigne wrote phrases all over the beams in his tower, this was not to remind him of 
their content but rather to provoke new and interesting thoughts of his own. 
With the assistance of technology, writing and later photography evolved from 
being simply supports of memory. The inheritances of Gutenberg and Daguerre 
were the fixed objective records that were widely understood and shared through 
all levels of society. In such an environment, a new aspect of memory became 
possible. Memory could be held to account against the public record, and could be 
held as ‘wrong’ if it contradicted it. Truth became normative for memory. 
This, of course, is a caricature of a number of complex psychological, social, 
technological and philosophical developments; it is not meant to be a potted histo-
ry of memory. The point is to argue that the spread of use of technologies as 
memory supports has created a situation in which truth is normative for memory 
in ways that it was not, and could not have been, before those technologies exist-
ed, and that to treat truth as normative is to downplay other aspects of memory 
that could have been and no doubt were important in the evolution of the faculty 
in both non-human animals and human societies. 
Worries About Memory-Supporting Technology and 
Lifelogging 
The recent literature has thrown up some particular persistent worries about life-
logging, related to the perception that a person’s lifelog contains truths that the 
human memory does not have, and that it is therefore reliable in a way that the un-
enhanced human is not. In particular, these are focused around the development of 
unbalanced, or psychologically disturbing, images, particularly self-images, and 
around the privacy of the individual. 
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As an example of the first idea, legal scholar Anita Allen argues that an ‘unre-
dacted lifelog could turn into a bigger burden on balance’ because ‘electronic 
memory enables destructive reminding and remembrance’ (Allen 2008, 56-57). 
We would be more prone to dredging up horrible memories from the past. ‘The 
lifelogging concept is insensitive to the therapeutic value of forgetting the details 
of experience’ (Allen 2010, 64). ‘The technology will enable excessive rumination 
by persons experiencing unipolar or bipolar depression’ (Allen 2010, 64-65). Po-
litical scientist Viktor Mayer-Schönberger agrees that the consequences of this 
technology are that stupid adolescent mistakes can take on disproportionate signif-
icance in later life (2009). 
On privacy, Mayer-Schönberger also argues that ‘comprehensive digital 
memory represents an even more pernicious version of the digital panopticon’ so 
that ‘the future has a chilling effect on what we do in the present’ (Mayer-
Schönberger 2009, 11-12). Allen sets out in some detail the argument that saving 
information about oneself would leave one open to invasions of privacy. Not only 
could one find oneself under surveillance (or, as it is sometimes termed, ‘sousveil-
lance’) from lifelogger friends and acquaintances (Dodge & Kitchin 2007, 434-
437), but also ‘a government that has traditionally enjoyed access to communica-
tions and correspondence will want access to lifelogs’ (Allen 2008, 67). 
The purpose of this chapter is not to argue that these worries are unfounded. 
Quite the opposite; I am sympathetic, although I do think that they are often over-
stated. The danger, broadly, is that we will be confronted with the truth and noth-
ing but the truth – but not necessarily (in fact, probably not) the whole truth. 
The development of memory-supporting technology will result in a great deal 
of reliable information swilling around, relatively easy to access, from all sorts of 
sources including surveillance, sousveillance, social networking and lifelogging. 
Our social norms seem to be developing too slowly to keep pace; we live in a 
world of what we might call ‘Intimacy 2.0’, where rights to privacy are constantly 
neglected, eschewed, ignored or undervalued by a society that is increasingly ex-
hibitionist and archival (O’Hara 2010b). 
One danger of a situation where there is social upheaval while social norms fail 
to keep pace is that there will be pressure to conform; lifelogging is currently a 
fringe activity, and if all lifeloggers are volunteers then it may be unproblematic 
even if they become a majority. Allen anticipates the possibility that we might 
reach a situation where someone who wishes to retain control of the information 
about them (the traditional conception of informational privacy) comes to be seen 
to be abnormal; in that case, the fact that one does not keep a lifelog may itself be 
seen as suspicious (Allen 2008, 74). In such a world, our reasonable expectations 
of privacy (an important aspect of common-law protection of privacy) will decline 
(McArthur 2001, Bailey and Kerr 2007), with potentially deleterious effects across 
society. 
There is an additional danger of seeing this sort of problem as exclusively a 
technological one. Not only could memory, which as Sellen and Whittaker argue 
(2010, 77) is a complex, multi-faceted set of concepts, come to be seen in an im-
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poverished way as what Proust called a ‘simple cinematographic vision’, but also 
that what may be sociotechnical problems come to be seen as amenable to techno-
logical solutions. 
Entirely technical solutions are very unlikely to work. As has been noted in 
many quarters, the use of complex privacy controls merely confuses users; priva-
cy-enhancing technologies generally suffer severe usability problems (Sasse and 
Flechais 2005). The point of lifelogging is that one does not have to think too hard 
about collecting, storing and retrieving information (O’Hara et al 2009); one of the 
ways that social networking sites like Facebook can get people to share infor-
mation in more lucrative ways (for advertisers) is to set privacy defaults at a low 
level. Security techniques are similarly flawed; of course good security is a fine 
thing, but in a socio-technical system it is not just the technology but the way it is 
used that needs to be made secure. There is no point getting someone to create and 
regularly change a complex password if they end up having to resort to sticking it 
onto their computer screen with a Post-It (Inglesant and Sasse 2010). 
Mechanisms to Subvert the Record 
Hence a recent strand of thought has begun to develop the idea that the record 
itself could be subverted; this would have the effect of undermining the normative 
claims of truth. Mayer-Schönberger suggests the use of sell-by dates for infor-
mation, so that stored information has associated with it a deletion date (Mayer-
Schönberger 2009, 171-181). One creates one’s Word file, say, and as part of the 
settings it might include a date when the file deletes itself (say, one year after the 
last edit). One could reset this at any time (as one can reset other metadata pa-
rameters, such as read and write permissions or filenames). 
This idea has severe usability difficulties associated with it. The idea that one’s 
old essays, letters or whatever might disappear because one forgot to set the de-
lete-by date properly, is disturbing. It is hard to see it catching on; it seems a reci-
pe for irritation (another box to tick before I can start editing my file), misunder-
standing (particularly in a corporate context when files may have multiple editors 
with different ideas about this sort of thing), confusion (how does one calculate 
the time when information will become useless?), neglect (as one more and more 
often resorts to the default) and finally horror (oh my God my teenage nov-
el/pictures of Grandpa/bookmarks relating to my old research have disappeared). 
Dodge and Kitchin (2007) suggest that we might subvert the aims of those who 
wish to breach our privacy by a process of randomized falsification. Lifelogs 
might be programmed to change a small number of pieces of information so that 
they misrepresent reality. This is an interesting suggestion, as it uses the norma-
tivity of truth to undermine threats to privacy or self-perception; because truth is 
normative, and because it is possible that information retrieved from the lifelog is 
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false, then the information, or what Bell calls the e-memory (Bell and Gemmell 
2009), is that much less valuable. 
This solution, though clever, is I think too clever by half. The problem is that 
although the normativity of truth is a problem, the value of the lifelog is its truth. 
Randomized falsification undoes some of the worries about memory-supporting 
technologies at the cost of rendering them less useful. In general, making them 
less useful will address all the worries given above, because if they are less useful 
they are less likely to be used, and therefore the anticipated problems with them 
are less likely to occur. The lifelog’s creator wants access to information that is 
true; he is not interested in having false memories (the pro-lifelogging literature 
harps on at great length about the fallibility of memory – e.g. Bell and Gemmell 
2009, 51-56). So a system that serves up potentially false information seems not to 
fit the bill at all. 
In general, philosophies of deletion and manipulation seem to throw the baby 
out with the bathwater; the advantages of abundant information seem clear and 
overwhelming, even if there will be associated difficulties. Information is clearly 
valuable, and is obviously perceived to be so because so many people spend so 
much time and effort trying to gather it. Storage and retrieval are incredibly cheap, 
certainly by historical standards, in which case the germane question is not ‘why 
are we doing this?’ but rather ‘why not?’ 
Conclusion: The Perils of Rich Representations 
Given the usefulness of writing, it seems that Socrates’ plaints in the Phaedrus 
were overdone; few would advocate a return to an oral culture, even as an Edenic 
fantasy. However, his point is well-made in so far as the shift from orality to liter-
acy required corresponding shifts in norms to regulate our expectations with re-
spect to discourse in general. It may be, if lifelogging and the use of memory-
supporting technologies take off as its advocates, like Bell, predict, that an analo-
gous shift will also be required. We have been used to our pasts decaying from 
scrutiny at predictable rates; no doubt our e-memories will degrade, but not in a 
smooth way. One might lose last week’s photographs while the ones of that em-
barrassing party thirty years ago remain stubbornly current. This is a new circum-
stance, where one’s past cannot be expected simply to erase itself, and it is one to 
which we need to adapt. A past lifelog will have a presence, and we will need to 
understand what it is saying – and what it is not. 
The point is not about good and bad technologies, but rather their use and mis-
use. We need to guard not against information processing and storage power, but 
rather what comes with them. 
First of all, we need to guard against the closed world assumption. In compu-
ting and knowledge representation, this is the assumption that whatever cannot be 
asserted on the basis of a knowledge base is false – in other words, the assumption 
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that the knowledge base is complete. With respect to a lifelog, or all lifelogs put 
together, or even the whole of the World Wide Web, this is a very dangerous as-
sumption. To assume that ‘if I can’t find it with Google it can’t be important’ is 
extremely worrying in a world which is partially recorded by digital technologies, 
but where major inequalities of access correlated with age, educational achieve-
ment or nationality are evident. 
Second, we must guard against the assumption of, or demand for, consistency. 
If truth is normative for memory, then inconsistency is symptomatic of a false 
memory somewhere. Yet given the shades of meaning and understanding underly-
ing memories, it is not only plausible but commonplace to find different people 
with entirely different memories of an event, created and curated in good faith. A 
future world where one’s testimony was automatically assessed as of less worth 
than, say, the records of one’s Web browsing clickstream, or one’s email inbox, or 
one’s camera, would be a very worrying one. Even if truth remains normative for 
memory, the e-memories of browser, email program and camera are subject to in-
terpretation too. 
Third, we must guard against hindsight. Decisions made under uncertainty may 
seem to be poor, yet it is extremely easy to underestimate the complexity of real-
time decision-making when we are in possession not only of the record of how the 
consequences of a decision unfolded, but also a richer picture of the context of 
that decision than could possibly have been available at the time. 
Fourth, as many commentators have noted, there is an increasingly lack of in-
terest in, and respect for, the distinction between public and private space. In part, 
this is the result of a lack of care in society as a whole, as I have argued elsewhere. 
One blatant misrepresentation that is often passed around is that privacy is in the 
interest of the individual, while publicity is in the interest of wider society (‘the 
community’). Nothing could be further from the truth; abundant information and 
transparency are often in the interests of the individual, while privacy is in many 
respects a public good (O’Hara 2010b). Its neglect can often be seen as a tragedy 
of the commons (Anderson and Moore 2006). 
Broadly speaking, our autonomy demands informational self-determination. 
That is not an easy thing to define or protect, and cannot simply be assimilated to 
our preferences for sacrificing privacy for material gain. In particular, even though 
the growth of lifelogging and memory-supporting technologies continues, we 
should be careful that this does not undermine our reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy. We should not be seduced by the richness of the lifelog into accepting all its 
assumptions, assertions and details. 
We should, at all costs, retain the right to be a mystery. 
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